Oil Watchdog

1) What did the testimony reveal about the other oil giants’ level of
preparedness in dealing with another Deepwater Horizon catastrophe?

Much of the hearing focused on the fact that the oil spill contingency
plans were disturbingly similar to each other. Aside from the
embarassing references in the plans to extinct walruses and dead
experts, Rep. Stupak pointed out that more than one company used the
same contractor, Marine Spill Response Corporation, for their plans and
that at their core, the plans all called for basically what BP had
done. Rex Tillerson, chief executive of ExxonMobil, said that this
"shouldn’t come as much of a surprise", given that they were all
dealing with similar situations.

What should come as a surprise, of course, is not the plain fact that
an industry has similar ways of dealing with specific problems, but
rather that a contingency plan that was so poorly devised and executed is the model
replicated throughout the American oil industry. Indeed, were an
incident similar to Deepwater to occur again, "We are not well-equipped
to handle [it]," admits Tillerson. Building a relief well, an expensive
and time consuming enterprise that could not stop the damage nearly
soon enough (BP’s relief wells are expected to be completed in
mid-August), is the "only" surefire remedy to such a leak, admits James
Mulva, chairman of ConocoPhillips.

Such a revelation provides a new justification for President Obama’s
drilling moratorium–surely it would be unconscionable to continue
drilling knowing that we were not prepared for the risks.

2) How do we move forward?

It is abundantly clear after this hearing that there were specific red
flags in how BP constructed their Deepwater Horizon well–the other oil
executives repeatedly cited serious problems with "casing design" and
other mechanical issues. This, hopefully, can be prevented with smarter
and more thorough regulation.

But the focus, despite Tillerson’s
assertions, can’t only be on prevention. The response to this oil spill
was uncoordinated and underprepared. As the New York Times points out,
damage to the coastline and wildlife could have been mitigated with
more coherent leadership and better utilization of resources.

Indeed, Lamar McKay, President of BP America, kept referencing a
"Unified Command Structure", but what this actually means never became
clear over the course of the hearing. Is BP ultimately in charge? Or is it the
Coast Guard?

Are the local authorities, who know the area
best, being given opportunities to assist? Is information being
efficiently communicated to the people who need it?

Evidence
suggests that it is not. Going forward, to ensure that valuable
resources are utilized and that unnecessary damage is prevented, clear
lines need to be drawn in the command structure and regulations must be
put in place that require oil giants to have the relevant
equipment–skimmmers, booms, dispersants, etc.–in place and ready to
go–no matter what smaller company may techincally be "operating" a rig. New legislation adding drilling regulations to fix some of these problem seems impending.

3) What were the political currents behind the hearing?

It seemed that only one member of the committee–Rep. Griffith from
Alabama–defended the oil giants. Dismissing his colleagues’ questions
as "childlike", "petulant" and "disrespectful", Griffith called for an
end to what he thought was an act of political theatre. Of course he
was right to an extent–Rep. Stearns angrily called for McKay’s
resignation–but for the most part the questions were legitimate and
narrow. Democrats largely refrained, as their Republican colleagues
requested, from using the hearing as a springboard to call for new
energy legislation.

Several Republicans defended the oil companies in more subtle
ways–many asserted that it was important to continue drilling in the
Gulf and consistently lamented the loss of jobs as a result of the
moratorium. Democrats countered that it was important to establish
appropriate safety measures before resuming the drilling.